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While the critical role of imperfect information has become axiomatic in explaining health
care market failure, the theory is backed by little empirical evidence. In this paper we use a
unique panel data set with explicit measures of information and an educational intervention to
investigate the role of imperfect information about health insurance benefits on the demand for
supplemental Medicare insurance. We estimate a structural discrete choice model of the demand
for supplemental Medicare insurance that allows imperfect information to affect both the mean
and the variance of the expected benefits distribution. The empirical specification is a structural
panel multinomial probit with an unrestricted variance-covariance, including heteroskedasticity
and random effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The model is computationally
complex and is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood.
The empirical results indicate that imperfect information affects the demand for
supplemental Medicare insurance by increasing the variance of the expected benefits distribution
rather than by systematically shifting the mean of the distribution. We find that the increase in
variance due to imperfect information increases the probability of choosing nottopurchase
supplemental insurance by about 23%. We also found that controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity is important. The goodness of fit increased by about 25%andthe precision of the
estimated effect of information on the variance of the expected benefits distribution improved
dramatically.
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Much of the theoretical literature on health care since Arrow (1963) has pointed to imperfect
information as a central explanation of market failures. However, while the critical role of
information has become axiomatic, the theory is backed by little empirical evidence and there are
few estimates of the magnitude of the impact of information on decision making. Moreover, while
all second best policies are based on knowing the distribution of information, few information
distributions have ever been estimated. This paucity of empirical work is primarily due to the lack
of explicit measures of the state of information in existing data sets. In this paper we use a unique
panel data set with explicit measures of information and an educational intervention to investigate
the role of imperfect information about health insurance benefits on the demand for supplemental
Medicare insurance.
Medicare is an entitlement program that provides limited medical care insurance coverage
to individuals aged 65 and over. It is the major source of health insurance for older individuals in
the U.S. Because of Medicare's limitations, individuals still face substantial out-of-pocket financial
risk from medical care costs associated with ill-health (Rankin, 1988; Monheit and Schur, 1989).
As a result, about 80 percent of individuals aged 65 and over own supplemental policies that help
fill the gaps in Medicare (Monheit and Schur, 1989). The demand for supplemental insurance is
expected to greatly expand because of the rapidly growing number older individuals with large
health care demands and the possible fl.iture reductions in Medicare benefits as a result of health
care reform.
Recent policy concern has focused on the fact that individuals may not be sufficiently
knowledgeable about supplemental Medicare insurance benefits to make rational choices (New
York Times, 1991). McCall, Rice and Sangl (1986) reported that Medicare beneficiaries do not
have high levels of knowledge of their benefits and Rice, McCall and Boismier (1991) concluded
that better informed beneficiaries made more "effective" choices. In order to improve information,
Congress passed legislation standardizing Medigap policy benefit packages in 1992.
2However, little is known about the effects of imperfect information in health care markets
in general, let alone in the supplemental Medicare market. Almost all of the studies in this area
have usedindirectproxy measures of information. Moreover, despite Stigler's (1961) observation
that uncertain information is captured in the dispersion of prices, most previous empirical work
has focused on the impact of proxy information measures on the meanlevel ofprices.' For
instance, the largest body of work investigated the extent to which advertising influenced the
mean of health care prices (eg. Benham, 1972; Cady, 1976; Feldman and Begun, 1978; Kwoka,
1984). Others have investigated the effect of provider and population densities as proxies for
information on mean physician and hospitals prices (eg. Pauly and Satterthwaite, 1981; Frech and
Wooley, 1989). The few studies that have used direct measures of information include Kenkel
(1989, 1990), who studied the direct effect of information on health-related behaviors (e.g.
smoking, drinking) and medical care utilization, and Davidson el. at (1992), who investigated the
direct effect of infor-mation on the demand for supplemental Medicare insurance.
Restricting empirical models to allow information to affect decisions only by changing the
mean of the distribution of benefits (or costs) may seriously bias estimates of the impact of
imperfect information on decision making. In this paper, we specif' and estimate a structural
model that allows information to shift both the mean and the variance of the expected benefits
distribution,
More specifically, we estimate a structural discrete choice model of the demand for
supplemental Medicare insurance. Consumers have three options: (i) not to supplement and rely
only on Medicare for health insurance, (ii) purchase supplemental coverage from a health
maintenance organization (HMO), and (iii) purchase supplemental fee-for-set-vicecoverage or so
called Medigap policies (FFS). The utility ftinction conditional on choosing a particular alternative
contains the expected benefits from purchasing the particular supplemental insurance package and
AnotableexcepUona OiynoeandPoluhck (992) who *ew.p&ed to dccompo.e the vatw.ce in the diuibuton otphykian fee, into
uncerta,ninformaa ion and other souze,. Howgvcr,dueto lack otdaia on infonnaz,on, they wereforcedto ida,tfy the in(ormaIon effect, thro.gh n1ion,Iform uaumpIioeu
3the value of consumption after having paid for the insurance. The insurance premium enters the
model by reducing the value of consumption after purchasing the insurance. Information enters
the model through the valuation of the benefits. The individual's valuation of the benefit is
specified to be the true benefit plus a random error reflecting variation in tastes and information.
The information portion of the error is generated from a subjective information probability
distribution. More diffuse information implies a greater variance of the expected benefits
distribution and increases the probability that an individual makes mistakes. Consumers compare
the three options and choose the one that appears to offer the highest utility. The probability of
choosing an alternative is the demand for that alternative. We test whether information affects
demandfunctionby altering both the mean and the variance of the expected benefits distribution.
Thediscretechoice model requires functional forms for the conditional utility function and
the stochastic distributions. Wespeci&a flexible conditional utility function that places no
restrictions on the marginal rate of substitution of insurance benefits for non-insurance
consumption and a stochastic model that places no restrictions on correlations across time and
alternatives (other than those necessary for identification). The error structure is allowed to be
heteroskedastic to test whether individuals with less knowledge about Medicare benefits draw
from distributions with larger variances. Moreover, wetakeadvantage of the panel structure to
control for unobservedheterogeneity.In summary, we estimate a panel multinomial probit with
an unrestricted variance-covariance, including heteroskedasticity and random effects.
Most studies of discrete choice models have chosen multinomial logit (MNL) over
multinomial probit (MN?) models because MNL are computationally very easy to estimate.
However, MNL models impose severe restrictions on the covariance structure,, which makes them
unsuitable for our application since we want to model information in the error structure as well
individual correlation over time. The disadvantage of MN? is their computational complexity.
We overcome this complexity by using a simulated maximum likelihood estimator to keep the
model computationally feasible.
4Ii THE ROLE OF INFORMATION
Before specifying the empirical model, we illustrate how uncertain information can affect the
demand for a health insurance package with a simple example. The problem is framed as a
discrete choice problem in which consumers are offered an insurance package with a fixed set of
benefits for a certain price. The analysis obviously applies to situations other than health insurance
in which consumers face discrete choices.2
Consider individuals purchasing an insurance policy at price (P) that provides a single
standard benefit package. While everyone receives the same benefit package, the value of the
benefit differs across individuals due to factors such as risk preferences, health status, and
expected health care utilization. Individual i's value of the benefit in monetaJy units is given by B
and is distributed in the population according the density functionjtB).
Under perfect information, an individual purchases insurance if B > P. implying that the
aggregate demand fi.inctiôn is Y =(:ki'.Thisdemand ftinction is presented in figure 1, with
those choosing insurance given by the shaded area under the curve to the right ofF.
However, individuals rarely know the true benefit package, but rather have misperceptions
generated from the ways in which information diffuses throughout a population. Under uncertain
information, individuals believe the value of their insurance expected benefit to be .A1B+
where j., s a random draw from a subjective information probability density function go.'). We
assume that j.', is uncorrelated with B because values of true benefits are deterministic (even
though they vary across the population). An individual now purchases insurance if B1 > F,
implying that the aggregate function is Y = where h(ã) is the density function of B1
Uncertain information can affect the demand curve in two differentways: a) by shifting the
mean of the expected benefit distribution and b) by changing the dispersion (or variance). If the
mean of g(s) is zero then the information distribution is centered at the mean of the true expected
benefit distribution. In this case, all consumersmay misestimate their expected benefit, but there
Roani and Taub,nan (919) dvcIcped • i,niI& modelto exanune th role o(infoemtonm expl.ining unproduclive coumpon
Sis no overall systematic bias in the population as a whole. However, there is no reason to believe
exante thatthe mean of j.t,iszero. If the mean is positive, demand will be larger under uncertain
information, and, if the mean is negative, demand will be smaller.
The effect of an increase in dispersion depends on whether the price cuts the true benefit
distribution is to the left or the right of the mode. The effect of a mean-preserving increase in
dispersion is demonstrated in figures ila and rib, where h(.), the distribution of perceived benefits
(a1),isoverlaid on ft.), the distribution of true expected benefits B,,underthe assumption that
the mean of ji,iszero. In figure fla, where price cuts the distribution to the left of the mode, the
mean-preserving increase in dispersion shifts mass from the right of price to the left of price,
implying a reduction in demand. In figure ITh, where price cuts the distribution to the right of the
mode, the mean-preserving increase in dispersion shifts mass from the left of price to the right of
price, implying an increase in demand. Thus the probability of choosing an alternative changes
with information even if incomplete information does not change the mean of perceived benefits.
As a consequence, an empirical model that does not allow information to affect decisions
through both the mean and the variance of the perceived benefits distribution may seriously mis-
estimate the impact of information on demand. Moreover, the direction of the bias cannot a
prioribebounded. Also, a structural interpretation of a statistical model that does not permit for
the variance effect, such as the MNL used by Davidson et al. (1992), may mistakenJy conclude
that information changes the mean level of perceived benefits, i.e. that uninformed individuals
systematically over- or underestimate benefits. In the remainder of the paper, we set up and
estimate a model that allows information to affect both the mean and the variance of expected
benefits.
6ilL A MODEL OF THEDEMANDFOR SUPPLEMENTAL INSURANCE
In this section we integrate uncertain information into a utility maximizing model of the demand
for health insurance supplementing Medicare and derive an empirical specification. We first
present the underlying behavioral model, which characterizes the problem as a choice among
discrete alternatives. Each alternative has a benefit and a price associated with it. Consumers
choose the alternative perceived to provide the highest utility.Converting the behavioral
framework into an empirically estimable model requires specification of a functional form for the
conditional utility functions and a stochastic model.
Behavioral Assumptions
The basic Medicare program provides a limited amount of insurancecoverage for health care
services obtained from any provider in the private fee-for-service (FFS) market to individualsage
65 and over. Beneficiaries of this program can supplement Medicar&s basiccoverage by two
mechanisms: either by purchasing private insurance designed to fill some of thegaps left by the
federal program ('Medigap' policies), thereby remaining in the FFS market and preserving their
choice of provider, or by enrolling in health maintenance organizations (HMOs), thereby leaving
the FFS market and agreeing to use only those providers affiliated with the HMO, and in return
receiving broader coverage at little additional out-of-pocket cost. Both of these choices basically
fill in the gaps left by Medicare's limited coverage. Insum, consumers face a choice of: (1) not
purchasing supplement insurance (i.e. Medicare only), (2) purchasing an HMO supplement or (3)
purchasing FFS Medigap policies.The cost of a FFS or HMO supplement is reduced
consumption of other goods and services.
Let the expected utility for individual i conditional on choosing alternativej in period Ibe
U,, =U(E,p.C) where Cp is aggregate consumption net of insurance and j= m,j h which
refer to Medicare only, FFS supplement and Hv1O supplement,respectively. The budget
7constraint is Y11 Cq +Pp,where Pp is the price of alternativej in period 1.Substitutingthe
budget constraint into the conditional utility ftinction yields
=
U(B,p.- Pjt) (1)
The Medicare alternative carries a price of zero so that consumption equals income under that
alternative.
The unconditional utility maximization problem is:
Uj mD[U ,Ufl ,Uihil (2)
The solution to the optimization problem in (2) gives the alternative chosen and, when there are
random terms in the utility function, the probability the alternative is chosen which is interpreted
as the individual demand function. Summing these probabilities over the population gives the
aggregate demand function. Indirect utility functions for welfare analysis can be derived from
these demand functions (McFadden, 1981; Small and Rosen, 1981).
The Conditional Utility Function
-
Functional Form: Inorder to derive an estimable demand function, we need to specify a
functional form for the conditional utility function in (1). Consider a function that is linear in
parameters:
UUt=Bjjt+aQjr=k,+a(}ig—Pjr) (3)
where a is the marginal utility of consumption and is interpreted as the utility from benefit
package j.However,a linear utility function imposes a constant marginal rate of substitution
8between insurancebenefits andconsumption.In this case, income cannot affect the insurance
decision. For example,consider choosingbetweenFFSand Medicareonly. FFSis chosenif
U-Uinu=Bifi-BJnu+aPnu>O (4)
Inother words, FFSischosen over Medicare only if the marginalutility ofthe gain in benefits is
larger than the marginal utilityofforegone consumption. Withaconstant marginalrateof
substitutionimposed by the linear functional form, income differences out of the purchase rule.
Intuitively, increases in income only affectconditionalutility through consumption, since
only P can be spent on insurance. Under the assumption of constant marginalrateof substitution,
income does not affect the choice because consumption is always substituted at the same rate for
benefits regardless level of consumption. Therefore, the comparison of marginal utility of
benefits, Bfi — Bim:, to marginal utility of foregone consumption CZFmt in the decision rule
specified in (4) is the same for all levels of income. However, if there is a diminishing marginal
utility of consumption and therefore a diminishing marginal rate of substitution, then marginal
utility of forgone consumption falls as consumption and therefore income rises. We allow for this
possibility by allowing a to depend on income (1').
The Utilityof Expected Benefits: Asecond specification issue concerns the fact that there are no
direct measures of utilityofbenefits (But). Instead we parameterizeit to be a ftinction of
individual characteristics with the coefficients allowed to differ by alternatives. The utility of
expected benefits from alternativej is:
4, =+ +A1p., + (5)
9where X is a vector of individual characteristics that affect the individual's value of the benefit
package (e.g. health status, whether they have a regular physician, education, marital status). The
alternative specific intercept picks up the overall mean in the utility of expected benefits and is
augmented for each individual based on observed and unobserved individual characteristics. The
coefficients on the individual characteristics (X) are allowed to differ by alternative because, for
example, having a regular physician may make FFS supplemental insurance more valuable than
HMO supplemental insurance.
Uncertain information is introduced into the model through the random component in (5).
The random component in (5) consists of two additive factors which are assumed to be
uncorrelated with one another. The second random term, frj,).reflects"trues factors (e.g.
preferences) unobserved to the econometrician, whereas the first term ().jpu) measures the
divergence of the utility of an individual's belief about expected benefits from the utility of the true
expected benefits. Uncertain information is introduced through the jt11term.If the individual has
perfect information, then the value of.tg is zero. How uncertain information affects the demand,
depends on the distribution of .Thecoefficientmeasures the alternative specific utility of
the information.
Identi/icallon: Not all of the parameters in the conditional utility functions are identified. Since
the demand function for alternative jisthe probability that the utility from jisgreater than the
utility from all other alternatives, the demand function is based on differences in the conditional
utility functions. Therefore, as illustrated above in the case of income, terms that do not vary
across alternatives are differenced out of the model. Therefore, either the value of the variable or
the coefficient must vary across alternatives for the complete term not to be differenced out of the
demand function. Parameters that are constant across alternatives are identified if the value of the
variable differs across alternatives. For example, the marginal utility of consumption a is the
same across alternatives and is identified by the fact that the price varies by alternative.
10For variables that have the same value across alternatives (e.g. age, education, marital
status), the coefficient must vary across alternatives in order not to be differenced out of the
demand function. Because only differences in the coefficients that vary across alternatives can be
identified, we normalize the coefficients in the Medicare utility of expected benefit function to
zero and interpret the coefficients in the other alternatives relative to Medicare. In this case, the
marginal utility of FFS and HMO supplements are:
U—U,,,,, —/3oj+E/3eX —aPi,+2j+e,1,—e,,j=f,m (6)
The intercept and the coefficients on the X's are interpreted in terms of affecting the marginal
utility of the expected benefits from insurance supplementing Medicare.
Tue Demand Functions
The demand function for alternative j in period t is the probability individual i chooses j, i.e. the
probability that the perceived utility from j is greater than the utility obtained from any other
alternative. In order to derive the demand functions we need to speciFy the distributions ofijt
and p11. We assume that c— N(O,), where ￿isa 6x6 matrix (3 choices, 2 periods), and that the
conditional subjective probability distribution is p, Ii— N(J.z(I),K(1)),where I is a measure of the
individual's knowledge of insurance benefits.
Ai in the case of the utility function, not all of the variance parameters can be identified.
Indeed, identification of the variance parameters is a difficult topic, first discussed by Daganzo
(1979) and more recently by Bunch (1991). Estimatibility requires two normalization's on the
variance-covarjance matrix. First, because choice probabilities depend only on differences in utility
and therefore on the distribution of differences in theerror, we can reduce the dimensionality of fTl
by I for each period and thereby implicitly normalize one choice specific random component to be
11zero. A second normalization is necessary because the probability (I(V,C) is the same as the
probability 4(kV, k2cl). Therefore, we normalize the trace of the covariance (sub-)matrix to
equal n2/2 for each period, which makes the size of the parameters in the mean ftmction
comparable to the multinomial logit estimates3. These standard normalizations are discussed in
Bunch (1991).
We introduce two additional aspects to the variance covariance matrix. First, because, we
observe individuals at two points in time, we control for unobserved heterogeneity with an
individual random effect than picks up unobserved correlation over time, i.e. cov(e;,jt
This correlation over time captures the persistence in insurance choices over time that may be due
to unobserved preferences. This persistence has been found to.be important in other studies of
insurance demand (e.g. Neipp and Zeckhauser, 1985 and Ellis, 1985 and 1989). Second, we can
introduce additional variance effects that differ across individuals and choices according to other
covariates without an identification problem. Therefore, to estimate the effect of information on
the dispersion of the value of expected benefits, we add the term K(I)=c2*(I) to the first diagonal
element.
In summary, our specification for the variance-covariance matrix is:
(J)H+C21,'l2 0 0
W212 o,0
0 00 00 0
(7)
'p420044+CW4 0
SI'$2 0 054 (055 0
000 000
where w + a.i =+='r/ 2. For comparison, note that the covariance matrix of the
MNL can be written as a diagonal matrix with elements n /6.
The vinanceo(thc e,gjanc value ds*zibution w,daiying the rndo.n u*ahty ntcTprcia1on of the mukinomlii logit &a 11216
12JV. DATA
Sourceand Sample
The data used in this study were coUected from a sample of 332 Medicare beneficiaries
who attended one of 75 educational workshop held between October 1986 and May 1987 about
theirinsurancecoverage options, specifically Medicare itself, private supplementary Medigap
policies and Medicate HMOs. These workshops were being offered as part of a HCFA-sponsored
researchproject (Sofaeret. al, 1990). Individuals included in the analysis were 64 years or older,
and did not have dual Medicare/Medicaid coverage or both H?vlO and private supplementary
policies. The workshop participants were surveyed before the workshop and approximately one
year later about their knowledge of Medicare benefits, perceived health status, socio-economic
characteristics, and insurance coverage choices. The data form a two-year balanced panel with
the educational workshop intervention occurring in-between. However, because our sample only
contains workshop participants and not a random sample of the Medicare population, the
generalizability of the findings for policy analysis may be limited. More details on the sample and
the variables can be found in Sofaer et. al (1990) and Davidson et. al (1992).
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is the choice of supplemental Medicare insurance, FFS, H?vlO or
none. The distribution of the choices before and after the educational intervention are displayed
in Table 1. Before the intervention, approximately 90% of individuals supplemented Medicare,
with two-thirds choosing F.FS and one-third choosing HMO. After the intervention, the number
of individuals choosing not to supplement fell by about 40°h, the number choosing HMOsgrew
by about a third, and the number choosing FFS fell slightly.














Total U332 100.0% h332 100.0%
The choice-transition probability matrix is displayed in Table 2. Despite the education
intervention in-between years 1 and 2, the large number of observations on the diagonal indicates
the strong persistence of choices over time. The largest number of movers after the educational
workshop were those that had only Medicare in year 1. Of those, about half chose to supplement
after the intervention splitting equally between liMO and FFS. The next largest group of movers
where those that had FFS supplemental insurance before the workshop. Of those, about 15%
switched, almost all of which chose HMO. Finally, those that had HMO coverage seemed not to
switch at all. Indeed, only about 5% switched to private insurance and none dropped all
supplemental coverage.









































Descriptive statistics of the independent variables are given in Table 3. Most of the
demographic independent variables are self-explanatory —age,sex, white, education and
married. Regular doctor is an indicator as to whether the individual had a regular physician over
the last 5 years. Income is measured in hundreds of dollars. Rich is an indicator as to whether the
individual is in the top quarter of the US income distribution. Rich is included in the model as an
interaction with the insurance premium to test whether the price elasticity declines with income.
These variables do not chance over time. The remaining independent variables (Medicare benefits
knowledge, insurance premium, and health status) are described in more detail below
Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables
S:dDe •.::;j:M;nh,7,ói1...iItlaximu#,
Index (Year 1)' 2.79 7.45 0 5
Index (year 21 3.55 1.26 0 5
Status Index 8.27 2.26 3 12
Doctor ( 1) 0.39 0.49 0 1
Age 71.31 5.72 64 90
= 1) 0,36 0.48 0 1
= 1) 0.92 0.28 0 1
of Schooling) 13.92 3.02 8 20
(= 1) 0.49 0.50 0 1
(year 1) 2.70 1.16 0.52 3.31
(year 2) 2.73 0.90 1.04 3.20
(year 1) 5.65 1.80 2.27 6.60
(year 2) 4.45 1.29 2.02 5.13
(00's) 249.52 196.65 50 735
Top 25% of US) 0.47 0.50 0 1
15Information. Informationis measured by an index of Medicare benefits knowledge. The
Medicarebenefitsknowledge index is constructed based on respondents answers to 5 true-false
questions about Medicare coverage (see Table 4). The same questions were administered before
the educational intervention as part of the year I questionnaire and after the intervention as part of
the year 2 questionnaire. The 5 individual knowledge items at each wave were combined into an
aggregate scale to measure health insurance knowledge. The knowledge scale is simplythe sum
of individual correct responses. Allowable scores for the Medicare scale range from O-5.
1. Except for a deductible on the 1st day. Medicare pays all hospital Costs for up to 60 days?
2. The costs of eyeglasses are covered by Medicare?
3. Medicare does not cover the cost of prescription drugs you buy at the pharmacy?
4. If I need someone to help me Out at home because I can't get around as well as I used to.
Medicare will pay the costs?
5. If my doctor accepts assignment, s/he can't charge me more than Medicare allows?
Oneof the major changes betweenthefirst and secondroundswas a dramatic
improvement in Medicare benefits knowledge. The distribution of correct answers to the
Medicare knowledge questions is presented in Table 5. The mean number correct in year I is 2.79
out of 5 which is close to the random response mean, 2.5. In year 2 the mean number of correct
increases to 3.55.Theincrease in the number correct is reflected by the shift in mass from the
lower tail to the upper tail of the distribution.
Tbe nid va1dtty o(thmse k.d4e' imnuUd ic4 wu analyzed in Uvee epi to cen(rm that the item ld.ppropnatelybe
eombincd. Fir, correWiom among the Sii weretaor analyzed tot the açpro1wiiLeneu of co.t$tndin$ InCIrnnflury IflCIIW* of
benctithzy knowledge. Second. the reliabeirty (or kom co.wergalt vahdity) otlIw 5.4cm awnowy scale wu cima1cd u a mcaaurc of internal
co.nu*cncy. Third. the coocuxren validity o(thc 5-itom scale waa laded by gvaluthng illreWiombipwith iclected meaaur ava W4e in the data set
Sec D.vidaon et al. (1992)forthe retulta of theac analyaea.
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Total[ 332 100.00& I 332 100.00%
Another consequences of the educational workshop was a narrowing of the information
distributionin year 2. The individuals who entered the educational workshop with the least
knowledge were the ones who had the largest increase in test scores in year 2. The second
column of Table 6 reports the mean change in the knowledge scores conditional onyear 1
knowledge. Those whose scored two or less on the year 1 test dramatically increased their
number of correct responses. Those who entered the program knowledgeable about Medicare did
not in general increase their knowledge, probably because there was little room for improvement
for the knowledgeable group. The fact that the greater information gain wasamong the
uninformed led to a narrowing of the dispersion. This is reflected the last column in table 6 which
reports the mean number.of correct questions in year 2 conditional on year 1 performance.
Table 6: Year 2 Knowledge Conditional on Year 1
#QuetionMeanin#.





















Average (2.79) 0.76 3.55
17Finally, we note that improvements in information are somewhat correlated with switching
patterns between year 1 and year 2. Table 7 reports the mean change in Medicare knowledge for
each cell in the insurance transition matrix. The last column presents the gain in knowledge
conditional on year 1 choice. The largest gainers in information were those who had Medicare in
year 1; an increase of 1.27. These were also the individuals most likely to change their insurance
coverage in the second year. Of those who had no Medicare supplement in year 1, about half
chose to supplement in year 2 and this group of supplementers had larger gains in knowledge than
those who chose to remain with Medicare. Among those with FFS in year 1, some individuals
switched to }]MO and a few dropped all supplementation choosing Medicare only. Those that
switched from FFS to Medicare experienced a reduction in of information of -.2 compared to a
gain in information of about .6 to .7 for the those that remained with FFS or switched to HMO.
Table7: Mean InformationChangeand (cell size) by Insurance Choice Transition
YEAR 1
YEAR 2































Preferences and Secular Trends. The main mechanism through which the educational
intervention affects our model is through the change in Medicare knowledge. However, the FFS
and HMO intercepts are also allowed to be different between periods one and two to account for
other possible influences of the educational intervention on insurance choice such as shifts in
preferences as well as any other secular trends. The difference is parameterized by including a
18year 2 dummy variable in both the expected marginal benefits of HMO and expected marginal
benefits of FFS equations.
Insurance Premiums. The price of supplemental insurance is measured by the premiums.
Average FFS and HMO premiums were constructed off respondents' reports of annual premium
expenditures. The averages were constructed for separately for first and second round and based
on whether an employer subsidized the purchase of supplemental insurance. Employer subsidies
reduced the cost of insurance by more than half. The premiums are reported in hundreds of
dollars and the FFS premium is about twice as large as the HMO premium.
Health Status. The measurement of health status is an attempt to assess enrollees' relative
health risks that may influence demand for supplemental insurance. A direct measure of health
status is available in the data set: perceived health status. Three different questionnaire items for
health status were asked at baseline and from them, an aggregate perceived health status scale was
constructed. Perceived health status is the sum of scores on the three items asking the respondent
to rate his or her present health status, level of concern about health during the past 3 months, and
amount of pain experienced during the past 3 months. Each of these 3 items is scored on a 4-point
scale, with smaller numbers representing poorer health, more concern or more pain, and larger
numbers representing better health, less concern or less pain. Combining these 3 items produces a
scale encompassing 3 distinct and relevant dimensions which represent the domain of interest: a
health status measure which reflects the relative risk of health service use by enrollees. The
construct validity of the aggregate health measure was assessed in two steps.5
Fint, the rthability (cc item conveTge,1 veiidity) o(the 3-iteminneq icale wu ctime1gd u ameawe o( inlemaI c teny.Thc,. conc,nng
vaiid.ty wa, Igd by evaiuat1 the reIsicnthip o(ths acal. with aekdad meu,u. availabl, inthedMa a.
19V. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Estimation Method
Until recently, there have been few applications using multinomial probit models because
of the computational difficulties caused by high dimensional integration. McFadden (1989)
suggested the method of simulated moments to circumvent this problem and Hajivassiliou (1992)
provides a recent review of this research. We estimate this model using simulated maximum
likelihood (Lerman and Manski, 1981, Diggle and Gratton, 1984, Boersch-Supan and
Hajivassiliou, 1993, Lee, 1992), which allows us to perform specification tests and final
estimation on a fast personal computer using a program written in Gauss.6
The standard maximum likelihood method would try to maximize the response
probabilities (i.e. the likelihood that an individual chooses the observed sequence of insurance
alternatives) as a flinction of parameters 9. Because it is very difficult to evaluate the response
probability g9)and even standard numerical integration only provides an approximation of the
"twe' 9), the simulated maximum likelihood replaces it by an estimated probability This
estimated probability is generated by averaging over a number of simulated responses (draws).
The simulated maximum likelihood estimator maximizes:
where N is the number of individuals. Because of the nonlinearity of the logarithm and the
variance of the estimated response probability, simulated maximum likelihood estimates for a
fixed number of draws are not unbiased. However, we consider simulated maximum likelihood
estimators as a sequence of fUnctions that converge to the true maximum likelihood estimator as
the number of draws increases. We increased draws for the final results until doubling the number
6 Thc idv.nLqeo(thesm.ujilcd mctho4, cncnii1Iy with 11wmmthcrof dmcmioni. Fo. wmplc. s,lc rnmwniI U,tWoni
iligMiyficr thin11wünulacnroutincwith1000.kiwi m two dima,io.u. aumo.icii intcgiiien t&Jc, ikca4y 10 UmciIongcrthin iimul.Zion
i,t*Vaiion .nthrocdimoncionc.
20of draws did not change parameter and variance estimates by more than 1/100. This provides
sufficient precision for the purposes of this paper and we are therefore not concerned with the
asymptotic theoiy of the simulation variance or bias, discussed in Lee (1992).
We used the GHK simulation algorithm, described in Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud
(1992), to integrate multivariate densities. However, while Boersch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993) found that 20 draws were sufficient to produce a negligible bias in their Monte Carlo
example, there was a large variance and a substantial bias for 20 draws in our application. This is
to some extent due to the covariance matrix, which is "far" from being diagonal, and the
additional complexities that a real application entails. However, 20 draws provided good starting
values, 100 draws provided good point estimates, and 250 draws provided good estimates of
standard errors. The MNP results reported in Table 3 are for a final run with 1000 draws.
SpecificationSensitivity
Weestimated several versions of the model to explore the sensitivity of the specification.
We found that several variables were clearly irrelevant in that their coefficients were never
significant (in any model) and their exclusion did not influence the other coefficients. As a result
we deleted age, race, and gender. Furthermore, we could not reject the hypothesis that the
coefficients on health, regular doctor, and the interaction between regular doctor and health were
the same in the HMO and FFS expected benefits fi.inctions. This was somewhat surprising since
we expected that individuals who have a long standing relationship with a physician would prefer
FFS to HJvlO supplement. We therefore constrained these coefficients to be equal for FFS and
HMO. However, the intercept, period 2 dummy, marital status, education and the interaction
between rich and premium were left unconstrained. These restrictions substantially improved
numerical convergence, which is not unexpected given the recent findings that MNP models can
be very fragile (Keane, 1992).
21We also estimated the model under three different stochastic assumptions in order to
assess their restrictiveness: (i) a MNL version that assumed independence across alternatives and
time as well restricted uncertain information to enter only through the mean of the marginal utility
of expected benefits, (ii) a MNP which included allowed information to affect the variance and an
unconstrained covariance within each period (but which ignored the longitudinal design, i.e.
w4, =0),and finally (iii) a model that in addition allowed for serial correlation.
Unfortunately, we did not achieve convergence for the model with the full unconstrained
covariance matrix (7) because the matrix became singular during iterations. This was caused by
the very large serial correlation as soon as we allowed for correlations between c across periods.
The last two columns in Table 3 correspond to the covariance matrix with=w(coefficient
estimate in the second to last row), identical diagonal elements, and other off-diagonal elements
equal to zero. We tried several •other specifications with additional parameters (e.g. including
parameters for w2,w) and achieved convergence, but none of these other specifications yielded
a significant improvement in the log-likelihood.
Turning to Table 8, consider first the differences between cross-sectional and longitudinal
models (i.e the models that controlled for unobserved heterogeneity). The logit and probit
specifications without the person (first two columns) are quite similar in terms of goodness-of-fit.
The difference between the first and second models is that the 1VINP allows for correlation across
alternatives, includes the information effect in the variance but excludes the information effect on
mean. However, the goodness of fit does not change when both the cross-sectional MNP contains
both mean and variance information effects since both information effects are insignificant.













































































































































Note: standard errors in parenthe.i, significance: : 10%. • : 5%, • : 1%.
23However, moving to a panel model (the next two columns) that controls for unobserved
heterogeneity provides a substantial improvement in goodness-of-fit. In this case, while the
information effect in the mean remains insignificant, the information effect in the variance is now
significant. Interestingly, the magnitude of the information effect in the variance is the same in the
model that ignores unobserved heterogeneity (column 2) as in the models that control for it
(columns 3 and 4).Clearly, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is important for the
precision of the estimated effect. Additionally, when we control for unobserved heterogeneity, the
interactions between premium and rich and between health and regular doctor lose their
significance in the longitudinal models.
Coefficient Estimates
Based on the above discussion we focus our attention on the models in last two columns
of Table 3. The coefficient estimates are largely consistent with common expectations. The
coefficient on insurance premium is significantly negative indicating that an increase in premiums
reduces the demand for insurance. The interaction between premium and rich is positive, but
insignificant. The sign indicates that wealthier individuals may be less price sensitive. The next
set of coefficients starting with constant (HMO) through married refer to the coefficients in the
marginal utility of expected benefits from HMO. The last Set of coefficients staring with constant
(FFS) refer to the coefficients in the marginal utility of expected benefits from FFS. Since the
coefficients on health, regular doctor, and the interaction between regular doctor and health were
constrained to be the same for the HMO and FFS alternatives, they are not repeated.
We begin with the coefficients that are common to HMO and FFS. Those individuals who
were in good health and had a regular doctor were more likely to purchase insurance. However,
health status seemed to have no impact for those without a regular doctor. Individuals with a
regular doctor, however, were more likely to purchase insurance and the effect increased as health
status worsened.
24Turning to the coefficients that differed across HMO and FFS, the period two dummies
indicate that, as a result of the educational intervention above and beyond the effect through the
information variable, the second period demand for HMO increased over first period but not for
FFS. Thus, the workshop appears to have changed "tastes" in favor of HMOs. Finally, an
individual's formal education seemed to have no significant impact, but married individuals were
much more likely to choose HMO.
The second last row reports the person-specific variance effect. Notice the strong positive
and highly significant person-specific effect. This implies that the choices are highly correlated
over time through unobserved preferences. This is consistent with the strong persistence effects
in insurance demand reported by Neipp and Zeckhauser (1985) and Ellis (1985 and 1989).
The last column reports the effect of information on the variance. This effect is positive
and significant. Therefore, poor information increases the variance of the marginal utility of
expected benefits. Since the mean information effect is small and not significantly different from
zero, we conclude that the main effect of information is through increases in variance. When the
restriction of no mean bias is imposed (final column), the variance effects increases by about a
quarter.
Informationand Price Effects
The estimation results indicate that information affects the choice only though the variance
term. Therefore, since the majority of the sample choose to purchase supplemental insurance and
the price cuts the distribution to the left of the mode, improvements in information that reduce the
variance increase the demand for supplemental insurance. In this section we estimate the
magnitude of the information effects and compare them to the magnitude of price effects, based
on the model in the last column of Table 8.
25Tables 9 and 10 report simulations of the effect of "policy experiments" on the demand for
Medicare supplements for an individual with mean sample characteristics. Beginning with Table
4, in a group with the average understandingofMedicare. and personal characteristics of our
sample, 8.2% would not buy supplementary coverage. With minimal (no) information, this
proportion increases to 9.5% (a 15% increase); with maximum information, this proportion
decreases to 7.5% (a 21% decrease from the situation with minimal information). Using the
results reported in Table, we compare the size of the information effect with reductions in the
premiums of supplementary plans. We estimate that improving an individuaFs information about
Medicare benefits from the mean to the maximum level has the same effect on demand as a 25%
reduction in the premiums of supplementary health insurance.
Table9:
The Effect of Changes in Information on Buying No Supplements
no information sample meanfull information
information
variance effect 9.6% 8.2% 7.4%
Note: predictions for individual with mean sample characteristics.
Table 10:
The Effect of Reducing the Cost of Supplements on Buying No Supplements
Note: predictions for individual with mean sample characteristics.
26
actual price 10% 20%reduction... reduction
reduction rediàtIon :..: ..
8.2% 7.4% 6.5% 5.8% 4.5%VL SUMJv1ARY
In this paper we used a unique panel data set with explicit measures of information and an
educational intervention to investigate the role of uncertain information about health insurance
benefits on the demand for supplemental Medicare insurance. We estimated a structural discrete
choice model of the demand for supplemental Medicare insurance that allows imperfect
information to affect both the mean and the variance of the expected benefits distribution.
We estimated a model that included a flexible conditional utility function that placed no
restrictions on the marginal rate of substitution and a stochastic model that placed few restrictions
on correlations across time and alternatives. In particular, the error structure was allowed to be
heteroskedastic to test whether individuals with less knowledge about Medicare benefits get their
information from distributions with larger variances. Moreover, we took advantage of the panel
structure to control for unobserved heterogeneity. In sum, we estimated a structural panel
multinomial probit with an unrestricted variance-covariance, including heteroskedasticity and
random effects. In order to overcome the computational complexity of this problem we used a
simulated maximum likelihood estimator.
The empirical results indicated that imperfect information affects the demand for
supplement Medicare insurance by increasing the variance of the expected benefits distribution
rather than by systematically shifting the mean of the distribution. Since the majority of people
already purchase insurance, an increase in variance due to imperfect information reduces demand.
We estimate that if everyone, has perfect information, then the proportion of individuals not
purchasing insurance would fall by 23% from .096 to .074.
We also found that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity was important. The
goodness of fit increased by about 25% and the precision of the estimated effect of information on
the variance of the expected benefits distribution increased dramatically. More specifically, while
the size of the estimated information effect was approximately the same in the model that
27controlled for unobservedheterogeneityand the one that did not, the effect was significant only in
the model that controlled for unobserved heterogeneity.
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